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Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the
Uniform Commercial Code-A Modern
Definition for an Ancient Restriction
I. Introduction
In 1952 the Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated to ensure
"[u]niformity throughout American jurisdictions . .. ."' Article 9 of
the Code was addressed to secured transactions in commercial financing.
One of the most controversial provisions of Article 9 is found in section
9-503,2 which authorizes a secured party3 to employ self-help or nonjudi-
cial repossession in the event of default by the debtor.' Although the
constitutionality of this self-help remedy has recently been challenged, it
has generally withstood such attacks.' Therefore, an understanding of the
self-help remedy is a necessity for practicing attorneys.
While the remedy of self-help repossession may be inherently sus-
ceptible to creditor abuse, 6 it has been recognized as an essential ingre-
dient in commercial financing and serves to benefit both the creditor and
I. General Comment of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute, I U.L.A., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE XV (1968).
The desired goal has been virtually achieved with forty-nine states, the District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands adopting all articles of the Code. Louisiana has adopted only Articles
1, 3, 4, and 5. 3 U.L.A., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 7 (Supp. 1977).
2. U.C.C. §9-503 provides that,
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. . . .Without removal a secured party may render equipment
unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 9-
504. (emphasis added)
Unless otherwise specified, references to sections of Article 9 apply to both the 1962 and
1972 versions.
3. A secured party is defined generally as a "lender, seller or other person in whose
favor there is a security interest .... " U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(i) (1962), § 9-105(l)(m) (1972).
For purposes of this comment the term "creditor" will be used interchangeably with
"secured party."
4. A debtor is defined generally as "the person who owes payment or other perform-
ance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d).
5. The recent challenges upon section 9-503 have been directed at the state authoriza-
tion of a remedy that results in a deprivation of property without due process of law. At this
time no state court of last resort or federal court of appeals has sustained a constitutional
challenge upon section 9-503. See generally cases discussed at Benschoter v. First Nat'l
Bank, 218 Kan. 144, 147-48, 542 P.2d 1042, 1046 (1975).
6. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 441, at 1212
(1965), where it is observed that "'[in the underworld of consumer finance . . . reposses-
sion is a knockdown, drag-out battle waged on both sides with cunning guile and a complete
disregard for the rules of fair play."
the debtor.' The only restriction on the self-help remedy is that it must be
carried out without breach of the peace. Many provisions of the Code are
of relatively recent origin, whereas the self-help remedy with its breach of
peace restriction has evolved from a long historic process. The purpose of
this comment is to assess how this historic evolution has culminated in a
definition of breach of peace for section 9-503.
II. Historical Background of the Self-Help Remedy
A. From Anarchy to Abolition-Protection of the Debtor's Property
Interest and the Interest of Society
[In tracing the history of the self-help remedy] we must begin
not with the right of law of distress, but with the disposition of
impulse which naturally prompts an injured person to take from
the wrongdoer, if he dare, whatever is seizable and transport-
able. Passing on from the impulse we come to the fact, then to
the custom, and finally to the legal right of distraint.8
For many centuries the self-help remedy was tolerated, not because
of a conscious weighing of policies, but as a result of the weakness of the
legal institutions that control the self-help impulse. 9 As legal institutions
began to develop, the reaction against self-help grew until this remedy
was abolished in toto by the time of the Norman Conquest. The reasons
for the curtailment of self-help were a growing concern for the personal
property interests of the one against whom the remedy was exercised and
a reaction against the lawlessness that was apt to prevail when one was
permitted to take the law into his own hands. '0 In time, however, a third
interest evolved that resurrected the self-help remedy.
B. The Rebirth of Self-Help--Protection of the Creditor's
Property Interest
The evolution of the feudal system brought about renewed interest in
self-help remedies. This interest resulted from the need to have an
7. See Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 29, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971), in which the
court held that "[tihe most important remedy available to a secured party is the right to take
possession of the collateral following a debtor's default." (footnote omitted).
When a creditor decides that repossession is necessary, the self-help remedy is benefi-
cial since it prevents debtors from "skipping" with the collateral or inflicting greater than
normal wear and tear. In addition, it provides a creditor with an expeditious return of the
collateral before it can further depreciate and eliminates the necessity of expending court
costs to regain possession. All of these "creditor" advantages benefit the specific debtor by
decreasing the size of any deficiency judgment and consumers in general by making credit
more readily available at lower costs. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The
Poor Pay Even More, [1973] Wis. L. REv. 502, 522-23 [hereinafter cited as White];
Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitution-
al and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 772, 779 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Mentschikoff]; Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 82, 90-107 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
8. 3 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF REGAL LIAILIT' 279 (1906) [hereinafter cited
as STREET].
9. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 547 (2d ed. 1909).
10. d.
efficient procedure whereby the feudal lord could protect his property in
the hands of the tenant.II For personal property repossession1 2 the appro-
priate self-help remedy was recaption or reprisal, which "happens when
one hath deprived another of his property in goods or chattels . . .in
which case the owner of the goods . . may lawfully claim and retake
them wherever he happens to find them . ... "13
Even this authorization of self-help did not extend carte blanche, for
it was held that the "public peace is a superior consideration of any man's
private property; and . . . this natural right of recaption shall never be
exerted where such exertion must occasion strife and bodily contention,
or endanger the peace of society." 4
Through this expansion and contraction it was recognized at an early
stage that any self-help remedy would have to reconcile three competing
interests. These interests were as follows: (1) the property interests of the
debtor and creditor, 15 (2) the personal interests of the debtor, and (3) the
interests of society in discouraging acts of a criminal nature. The breach
of peace restriction thus served as the vehicle to effect this reconciliation.
Achieving a fair and justicious balance of these interests through a
definition of breach of peace was destined to be an extended and difficult
evolution. Even full acceptance of the right to assert self-help did not
eliminate the problems inherent in defining the perimeters of the breach
of peace restriction.
I. Id. at 276. One of the earliest forms of self-help was the action of distraint for
feudal services. Through the use of this remedy the feudal lord could distrain the goods of
the servant to coerce the performance of feudal services. Id; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *6 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE]; 3 STREET supra,
note 8, at 288.
It should be noted that the coercive element remains an essential advantage to the
creditor under section 9-503 since the creditor will generally realize a greater return if he can
exact full payment from the debtor rather than dispose of the collateral. Johnson, supra
note 7, at 89-93. In many cases there exists little market for certain types of used collateral.
Mentschikoff, supra note 7 at 779 n.34. The creditor must then incur further expense in
securing a deficiency judgment that may ultimately prove uncollectible. Once the creditor
has secured repossession, however, he is in a stronger position to negotiate with the debtor
to encourage further payment and, thus, guarantee the greatest economic return to the
creditor.
12. The scope of Article 9 of the Code extends only to security interests in personal
property. U.C.C. § 9-902 (I).
13. BLACKSTONE supra note I1, at *4. Blackstone noted,
The reason for this [remedy] is obvious, since it may frequently happen that the
owner may have this only opportunity of doing himself justice: his goods may be
afterwards conveyed away or destroyed; . . . if he had no speedier remedy than
the ordinary process of law.
Id. These same justifications have been put forth to support the self-help remedy available
under section 9-503. See Mentschikoff supra note 7, at 779.
14. BLACKSTONE, supra note I1, at *4-5.
15. The property interests of the creditor and debtor may be analyzed in respect to
further, more narrow interests. These interests include the personal property interests of the
creditor and debtor in the collateral, and the debtor's real property interests in freedom from
unauthorized trespass by the creditor in effecting repossession.
C. Legislative and Judicial Recognition of Self-Help
The self-help remedy was recognized in the United States at least as
early as 1842.16 In the earliest cases, the right of self-help repossession
was afforded by the terms of the contract. "7 Later cases held that this right
was inherent in the very nature of the conditional sales contract, even in
the absence of an express contractual provision. 18
The remedy of self-help repossession was recognized legislatively in
the Uniform Sales Act of 1918.'9 This Act specifically provided for an
implementation of the societal interest by prohibiting the employment of
any act of repossession that was contrary to the criminal laws.20 The
breach of peace restriction was included in this Act and has been part of
all self-help remedies to the present. 2
III. Breach of Peace Under the Uniform Commercial Code
A. The Foundation of Precedent for the 9-503 Definition
Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code is the present
manifestation of the self-help impulse and incorporates the traditional
breach of peace restriction. In establishing the section 9-503 procedure
the Code draftsmen intended to build upon the prior history of the self-
help remedy22 and not to create any new rights or obligations. 23 Thus, the
16. Prigg v. Commonwealth, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842). See also Shireman v.
Jackson, 14 Ind. 459, 460 (1860); Moore v. Shenk, 3 Pa. 13, 20 (1846).
17. See Annot., 55 A.L.R. 184 (1928); 69 AM. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions § 594
(1973).
18. See, e.g., Westerman v. Oregon Automobile Credit Corp., 168 Or. 216, 226, 122
P.2d 435, 439 (1942). See also 69 AM. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions § 584 (1973); 47 AM.
JUR. Sales § 942 (1943). This principal is also supported by the comment to section 9-503,
which provides that "the secured party's right to possession of the collateral ... accrues
on default .... " U.C.C. § 9-503, Comment.
19. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 16 provided,
When the buyer shall be in default in the payment of any sum due under the
contracts, . . .or in the performance of any promise the breach of which is by the
contract expressly made a ground for the retaking of the goods, the seller may
retake possession thereof. Unless the goods can be retaken without breach of the
peace, they shall be retaken by legal process; but nothing herein shall be con-
strued to authorize a violation of the criminal law.
20. Id.
21. In addition to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and section 9-503, the self-help
remedy with the traditional breach of peace restriction was incorporated into the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act in 1933. UNIFORM TRUST RECEITrs AcT § 6.
22. See references to prior uniform statutes in the comments to U.C.C. §§ 1-103 and 9-
503. Precedent to develop this history and define the term "'breach of peace" may be
obtained from cases decided under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act or cases in which the
self-help remedy was specifically authorized in the terms of the contract. See Southern
Indus. Say. Bank v. Greene, 224 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (recognizing that
the breach of peace provision of the Code was no different than under pre-Code statutes);
Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 281, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, 119 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
23. See Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 612 (6th Cir. 1974); A. & S Excavat-
ing, Inc. v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 31 Conn. Supp. 152, -, 325 A.2d 535, 537
(1974); Benschoter v. First Nat'l Bank, 218 Kan. 144, 148,542 P.2d 1042, 1046 (1975); Hill v.
Michigan Nat'l Bank, 58 Mich. App. 430, 436-37, 228 N.W.2d 407,410(1975); King v. South
Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 170, 330 A.2d 1, 5-6 (1974). But see Gibbs v. Titelman, 369
F. Supp. 38, 47 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Schmitt & Peck, Self-Help Repossession - The
Recurring Problems of Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 80 CoM. L.J. 223,
choice of the term "breach of peace" was not inadvertent. Nor was it an
oversight in draftsmanship that the proponents of Article 9 failed to define
breach of peace. 24 By neglecting to establish an all-encompassing defini-
tion, however, the proponents of the Code only perpetuated certain
inconsistencies that existed in pre-Code cases.
The remedy of self-help repossession is designed to balance the
interests of the secured party and the debtor. 2
5 The historic trilogy of
personal, property, and societal interests have played major roles in
achieving this balance. As these overlapping and often conflicting inter-
ests were resolved, a substantial body of precedent evolved that gave
form to the ambiguous prohibition against breach of peace and estab-
lished a definition for that term.
B. Personal and Societal Interests in the Breach of Peace Definition
1. Prohibition Against the Use of Force or Violence.-The class-
ic definition of breach of peace is derived from criminal law, which
provides that a breach of peace is
a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility, by
an act or conduct inciting to violence or tending to provoke or excite
others to break the peace . . . It includes any violation of any law
enacted to preserve peace and good order.26
In implementing the self-help policies of protecting the debtor's personal
interests2 7 and society's prohibition against the use of force, courts have
held that it is a breach of the peace to effect repossession by the use of
force directed against the debtor.28 Many courts in cases of self-help
repossession derived precedent from the criminal law definitions of
breach of peace.29
The criminal law definition of breach of peace is essentially oriented
to the use or threatened use of violence. Courts in self-help cases derive
precedent from this definition when violence occurs during the reposses-
sion. Unfortunately, however, at least one court that applied the criminal
231-32 (1975), in which it is argued that section 9-503 was not a mere codification of prior
procedure, but an expansion of creditors' rights under the influence of commercial interests.
24. See White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales and
Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 808, 809 (1970) (referring to the term
"breach of the peace" as a "shopworn phrase") [hereinafter cited as White]; Hogan, The
Secured Party and Default Proceedings under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 211 (1962).
25. See note 7 supra.
26. 2 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 802 (1957) (foot-
notes omitted).
27. Precedent to define the personal interests of the debtor may be derived from tort
principles that establish those rights of the debtor to be free from a harmful or offensive
touching, the apprehension of such touching, emotional distress or unconsented restraints
upon the freedom of movement. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 2,
Introductory Note at 22 (1965).
28. E.g., Nicholson's Mobile Home Sales Inc. v. Schramm, - Ind. App. -, -, 330
N.E.2d 785, 790 (1975) (creditor shoved and struck debtor).
29. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108, 115 (D.S.C.
1971); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 29, 254 N.E.2d 683, 686-87
(1970).
law definition has determined that violence is a "necessary" element to a
finding of breach of peace. 30 This strict requirement will give greater
latitude to the creditor than was intended by the proponents of the Code.
Additionally, when the courts have focused upon this one element of the
breach of peace definition, the debtor's personal and property interests,
which are historical antecedents of the breach of peace restriction, 3 1 have
been ignored.
When the secured party's method of repossession entails less than
blatant violence, the criminal law definition of breach of peace as a
violence-oriented concept may no longer be effective in protecting the
debtor's personal interests. Increasingly, the breach of peace definition is
analyzed from the tort perspective of harmful or offensive touching. 32 As
one court has concluded, "The seller is not entitled to use force to retake
possession of such property and if he does and in so doing touches the
resisting debtor he is guilty of assault and battery. "
33
2. Prohibition Against the Use of Threats or Intimidation .- In
addition to forbidding acts of outright violence, the criminal law defini-
tion of breach of peace prohibits any activities that may be likely to result
in the use of violence. 34 In implementing this policy, 35 courts interpreting
section 9-503 have established that it is a breach of the peace to effect
repossession through the use of threats or intimidation. 36 This prohibition
serves to assuage the societal concern about violent confrontations and
protects the personal interests of the debtor.
37
30. Harris Truck & Trailer Sales v. Foote, 58 Tenn. App. 710,-, 436 S.W.2d 460,464
(1968).
31. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
32. See Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972) (by implica-
tion) (creditor grabbed keys twisting debtor's wrist); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Phipps,
49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N.E. 793 (1911) (debtor sat on sewing machine to prevent repossession
and creditor tilted the machine causing the debtor to fall off); Spangler-Bowers v. Benton,
229 Mo. App. 919, 83 S.W.2d 170 (1935) (creditor pushed door open and struck woman in
stomach). The degree of contact in these cases is sufficient to support a cause of action for
battery under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965).
33. Lamb v. Woodry, 154 Or. 30, 35-36, 58 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1936) (emphasis added).
34. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
35. See Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 980, 341 S.W.2d 765, 767
(1961), in which the court observed,
The purpose of the rule against the use of threats of violence . . . appears to
be that the [creditor] may retake possession without legal procedure where and
when they can be done so peaceably and without incurring the risk of involving
violence. (emphasis added)
36. See Bordeaux v. Hartman Furniture and Carpet Co., 115 Mo. App. 556, 563, 91
S.W. 1020, 1021 (1906) (wife need not resist when overwhelming force is arrayed against
her); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 29, 254 N.E.2d 683, 686 (1973)
(intimidation when three of the creditor's agents gathered around debtor's seventeen year
old son); Pagan v. Drake Furniture Co., 73 S.C. 364, 53 S.E. 542 (1906) (seizure of tablecloth
at gunpoint accompanied by threats); Pryor v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 253 S.W.2d
493, 494 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952) (repossession cannot be effected by means of force, threats,
or fear).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21, which notes that such actions would
constitute an assault.
To constitute a breach of peace, the degree of intimidation need not
rise to the level of an actual threat of violence. All that is required is that
there is such a show of force as to create a reasonable apprehension in
the mind of the one in possession that he must yield to avoid a
breach of the peace, and he does so yield, this is a yielding upon force
and constitutes forcible trespass.3"
Likewise, if the creditor effects his repossession in a "harsh" manner the
requisite intimidation may be found, thus rendering his actions a breach
of the peace. One case has held that when the creditor "uses violent and
abusive language and commits such acts as are reasonably calculated to
intimidate or lead to a breach of the peace, he would be liable for trespass
",39
Not all threats will result in a finding of breach of the peace. A
secured party's threat violates the breach of peace restriction only if it
instills in the debtor a fear that any resistance will subject him to physical
abuse. In one case in which the secured party threatened to return and
"steal" the collateral if the debtor did not consent to its repossession, the
court concluded that this threat did not rise to the level of a breach of the
peace.
40
This restrictive interpretation of a "wrongful" threat serves to im-
plement the criminal law definition of breach of peace in that it discour-
ages only acts likely to incite retaliatory violence. The possibility of a
debtor reacting violently when confronted with a threat against his person
is arguably greater than the possibility of such a reaction when confronted
with a creditor's threat to "steal" collateral that the creditor is entitled to
possess.
4 1
38. Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 258, 171 S.E. 63,64
(1933) (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 258, 171 S.E. at 63. See Lewis v. Atlantic Discount Co., 99 So. 2d 241 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (court held that the conduct of two men who entered debtor's car and in
a harsh manner ordered him to drive to a certain location constituted a false imprisonment);
Jones v. H. Martini Furnishing Co., 77 Mo. App. 474, 477 (1898) (repossession in boisterous,
insulting, and threatening manner).
40. Ford Motor Credit Co. v, Ditton, 52 Ala. App. 555, 558, 295 So. 2d 408,411(1974).
In Ditton the collateral was an automobile and the subsequent "stealing" was carried
out on the premises of the debtor's employer. Such entry onto a third party's premises does
not constitute a breach of the peace. See note 72 and accompanying text infra. It is unclear
whether such a threat would amount to a breach of the peace if the collateral were a
household item and the only means of "stealing" would be by a forcible entry into a
debtor's residence. Such forcible entry would constitute a breach of peace. See note 43 and
accompanying text infra.
In Ditton the threat was to perform a permissible act of repossession while in the latter
example it would be to commit an act that constitutes a breach of the peace. A threat to
commit an act of violence is a breach of peace because the act of violence is itself a breach
of peace. A court may, thus, be more willing to find a breach of peace if the threat to "steal"
would have necessitated acts completely different from those subsequently performed in
Ditton. A threat to "steal," which necessitates an invasion of a debtor's residence, would
constitute an infringement upon the personal and property interests of the debtor and, like a
threat of violence directed against the debtor, has the potential to incite retaliatory violence.
41. But cf. Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945,967 (W.D. Mich. 1974),
rev'd mer., 516 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that in certain cases repossessors have been
killed by debtors who sought to protect their personal property interests in the collateral).
Violence or even the threat of violence is not, however, the sine qua
non to a finding of breach of the peace. 42 One must examine in addition
the various property interests of the debtor and creditor.
C. Real Property Interests in the Breach of Peace Definition
I. Entry into Residential Structures.-To effect repossession,
whether in the debtor's presence or not, it will often be necessary to tread
upon the debtor's premises. The historic policy against trespassing upon
realty in pursuing the self-help remedy is still evident in certain interpre-
tations of the breach of peace provision of section 9-503. The firmest
anti-trespass rule is that an entry affected by breaking and entering into a
debtor's residence during his absence is a breach of the peace.43 The
purpose for this rule is to protect the sanctity of the debtor's home44 and to
discourage acts that may incite retaliatory violence.
4 5
In determining what constitutes a sufficient breaking and entering to
amount to a breach of the peace, courts in repossession cases again turn to
the criminal law for guidance. They do not, however, turn to those
criminal law precedents that define breach of the peace and seek to
preserve the harmony of the community, but to those precedents that
serve to protect the property interests of the debtor (e.g., breaking and
entering statutes). 6 Thus, to have a wrongful breaking into the debtor's
42. See Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108, 115 (D.S.C. 1971); cf.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ditton, 52 Ala. App. 555, 558, 295 So. 2d 408, 411 (1974)
(constructive force may exist if repossession is effected by means of threats or intimida-
tions).
43. E.g., Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So, 491 (1939);
Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Mileman v. Harter Bank & Trust
Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E.2d 853 (1962); Stewart v. F.A. North Co., 65 Pa. Super. 195
(1916). Contra Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974). The Calde-
ron case is the only case of recent origin to hold that a forceful breaking into a residential
structure was not a breach of the peace. In that case the court by implication held that the
creditor's secured interest in the collateral was sufficient to justify such a method of
repossession. 505 F.2d at 951. In Calderon, plaintiff waged a constitutional attack upon
section 9-503, and the record does not indicate whether the breach of peace argument was
advanced in the lower court. Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 371 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex.
1973). Beyond this possible. explanation there is no rationale for the court's clear departure
from the general rule.
44. See Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 147, 257 N.W. 400, 402 (1934); Van Wren
v. Flynn, 34 La. Ann. 1158, 1159 (1882).
45. See Stewart v. F.A. North Co., 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 195, 200-01 (1916) in which the
court noted that
such action has a tendency to excite a breach of the peace and invite violent
resistance, . . . We are unwilling to give to the contract under consideration a
construction which would permit the [creditor] to batter down doors or break
windows or engage in acts of violence in the exercise even of an undoubted right
to the possession of the chattel. . . . This construction would subject many
homes to invasion at the will of [creditors] . . . and would be promotive of
disorder and frequent breaches of the peace.
46. Since in these cases repossession occurred during the debtor's absence, a narrow
application of the breach of peace definition as a violence-oriented concept may result in a
finding that no breach of the peace has taken place. By applying a criminal-law definition
oriented to property interests, however, a breach of the peace can be found. In cases in
which the repossession is carried out on the premises of the debtor or a third party during
the debtor's absence, the courts, by applying a narrow criminal-law definition have uniform-
residence "it is generally held that no greater force is required than that
which is employed to remove any obstruction or barrier to the defendant's
entrance. "
4 7
In applying this test courts have held that the breaking need not be
violent to fall within the scope of the section 9-503 prohibition. A breach
of the peace has been found in cases in which the entry was affected by
turning the knob of a closed but unlocked door,4 8 by raising a closed but
unlocked window, 49 or by using a key found under a doormat. 50 Natu-
rally, when greater force is employed to gain entrance, a breach of the
peace has also been found.5
2. Entry into Nonresidential Structures.-When the creditor
seeks to repossess the collateral by entering into a nonresidential struc-
ture, courts have accorded less protection to the real property interests of
the debtor and have resolved the breach of peace issue by focusing more
upon a criminal law definition oriented to the use of force or violence. A
breach of the peace has been found in cases in which entry is gained to
such nonresidential structures as garages52 or stables53 by actual physical
breaking. When, however, the structure is open and nonresidential and
entry is affected without a physical breaking, the traditional element of a
forceful entry is lacking. Thus, entries to an open garage54 or carport55 to
repossess cars or to an open hangar to repossess an airplane56 are not
breaches of the peace, since the invasion of the debtor's real property
interest is no greater than the law will sanction.
In two recent cases courts have drawn further distinctions between
the jealous care with which the law protects residential structures and that
with which it protects commercial structures. In Cherno v. Bank of
ly found no breach of the peace. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text infra. The only
distinction between these cases and those in which an entry into a debtor's residence has
been effected is the application of the strong property policy to the latter. Without this
policy a breach of peace will not be found.
47. 2 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 412 (1957) (foot-
note omitted).
48. See Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934).
49. See Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 169 S.E. 236 (1933).
50. See Kemmitt v. Adamson, 44 Minn. 121,46 N.W. 327 (1890) (dictum); M.J. Rose
Co. v. Lowery, 33 Ohio App. 488, 169 N.E. 716 (1920).
51. See Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So. 491 (1939) (entry
by breaking wire that held door closed); Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148 (D.C.
1958) (entry by breaking window); Stewart v. F. A. North Co., 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 195 (1916)
(entry by removing board that covered broken sash); Soulious v. Mills Novelty Co., 198
S.C. 355, 17 S.E.2d 869 (1941) (entry by removing staple that held padlock on door).
52. Dominick v. Roe, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N.W. 184 (1924); Wilson Motor Co. v. Dunn,
129 Okla. 211, 264 P. 194 (1928) (by implication); Voltz v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 332 Pa. 141, 2 A.2d 697 (1938); A.B. Lewis Co. v. Robinson, 339 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1960).
53. Williams v. Tolbert, 76 S.C. 211, 56 S.E. 998 (1907); Rucker v. Smoke, 37 S.C.
377, 16 S.E. 40 (1892).
54. C.I.T. Corp. v. Short, 273 Ky. 190, 115 S.W.2d 899 (1938).
55. Raffa v. Dania Bank, 321 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
56. Kroeger v. Ogsden, 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967).
Babylon5 7 the court held that evidence of the creditor's forcible breaking
by the use of a key obtained through unauthorized means was immate-
rial.58 The court resolved the breach of peace issue by applying a strict
criminal law analysis of whether a disturbance of the peace and quiet of
the community had occurred.59 Because such a disturbance had not
occurred, the court held that the actions of the creditor did not rise to the
level of a breach of the peace.
60
A possible explanation for the court's analysis is that the Cherno
case arose out of a suit between two creditors of the debtor. The plaintiff,
debtor's assignee, sought to invoke the breach of peace provision of
section 9-503 to contest defendant's repossession of the secured collater-
al. In holding that the method of repossession was not a breach of peace,
the court ignored the debtor's real property interests. Whether the court
would have abandoned the general rule if the suit had been brought by the
aggrieved debtor is open to speculation. 6' Adequate precedent was avail-
able for holding that the fraudulent procurement of a key 62 and the
unauthorized entry into a commercial structure 63 was a breach of the
peace.
In Wirth v. Heavey64 a further exception was established for com-
mercial structures. In Wirth the debtor had entered into an arrangement to
purchase business equipment and to lease a commercial structure from the
creditor. When the debtor defaulted upon both the rent and the promis-
sory note that secured the equipment, the creditor entered the structure by
forcibly breaking a lock on the door and repossessed the equipment. In
holding that the method of repossession was not a breach of the peace, the
court noted that the debtor's default in payment of the rent was sufficient
justification for permitting the creditor, in his role as lessor, to forcibly
enter the structure and, once inside, to repossess the equipment. 65 The
57. 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
58. The court admitted that, under ordinary circumstances, such entry would consti-
tute a forcible breaking, but, since the creditor was authorized to enter by the terms of the
contract, it would not amount to a breaking in this particular case. 54 Misc. 2d at 281, 282
N.Y.S.2d at 120. The court failed to recognize that contractual waivers of acts that consti-
tute a breach of the peace have been held invalid. See notes 157-58 and accompanying text
infra.
59. See 54 Misc. 2d at 281-82, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 120, in which the court concluded that
even if the acts of the creditor amounted to a breaking "there was nothing in what they did
that disturbed public order by any act of violence, caused consternation or alarm, or
disturbed the peace and quiet of the community. Nor was the use of a key to open the door
likely to produce violence .... "
60. Id. at 281, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
61. See White, supra note 24, at 811.
62. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
63. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
64. 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
65. Id. at 266. Contra Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Ct. App.
1968), in which the court held that the property interest of the creditor-lessor Gulf Oil would
not justify "'picking" the lock and entering the commercial structure, although the debtor
defaulted on both the rent and a promissory note that secured the collateral.
In Wirth the lease provided that the creditor, in his status as a lessor of the commercial
court asserted, "There can be no breach of the peace by a party forcibly
entering premises to which he is entitled to possession."
66
If the rationale for prohibiting forcible entries into nonresidential
structures by a secured party is to protect the debtor's real property
interests, there is no justification for the two recent exceptions for com-
mercial structures enunciated in Cherno and Wirth. While it is possible
that commercial structures are not entitled to the same degree of protec-
tion that courts have extended to residential structures, they should at
least be accorded some protection against the type of fraudulent breaking
that occurred in Cherno and the type of violent breaking that occurred in
Wirth. Likewise, since cases have held that a forceful breaking into such
nonresidential structures as garages or stables is a greater interference
with the debtor's real property interests than the law will permit, 67 it is
inconsistent to hold that a similar interference with his interest in a
commercial structure is entitled to a lesser degree of protection. Finally,
if one of the justifications for prohibiting intrusions into residential
structures is to discourage acts likely to incite retaliatory violence, 68 a
similar rationale, albeit to a lesser degree, should justify an application of
the same prohibition to commercial structures.
3. Entry Onto Debtor's or Third Party's Premises.-While courts
are concerned with the protection of real property rights when the creditor
enters a structure owned by the debtor, a less stringent standard of review
is applied when the entry is merely upon the premises of the debtor. 69 In
the latter case the real property analysis is abandoned, and a finding of
breach of peace is limited to instances of violence or the threat of
violence. The rationale for this approach is that the creditor's right to
premises, "would have the right to reenter and take possession of the premises without
judicial proceeding." 508 S.W.2d at 266. While not specifically prohibiting such provisions,
the Supreme Court of Missouri criticized this practice in Sackett v. Hall, 478 S.W.2d 381,
383-84 (Mo. 1972). In addition, any nonjudicial repossession of personal property by a lessor
to coerce payment of rent has been specifically prohibited. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. Fed. 223
§ 16 (1974). Hence, the lessor's right in Wirth to forcibly enter was rather tenuous and, if
authorized, was only sufficient to support repossession of the leased premises. The court,
however, permitted the lessor, once he was inside, to assume his additional status as a
creditor with a secured interest in the collateral.
While the Missouri Court of Appeals found nothing objectionable in this approach, the
holding represents an unwarranted expansion of the rights of a secured party. A party with
the status of a secured party could not have entered the structure without committing a
breach of the peace. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra. Likewise, while one
with the status of a lessor may enter to regain possession of the premises, he may not seize
any of the lessee's personal property without judicial process. It is inconsistent to rule that
one with a dual status may exercise rights beyond that of the individual statuses combined.
66. 508 S.W.2d at 266.
67. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Raffa v. Dania Bank, 321 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Provided the repossession of the collateral on the debtor's premises is effected in a
reasonable manner, the real property interests of the debtor are immaterial. If, however, the
repossession results in damage to the debtor's real property, the creditor may be held
accountable for the damage. See Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 168
S.E.2d 827 (1969).
repossess is a license 7° that is sufficient to sanction the creditor's entry
onto the debtor's property without being subject to an action for tres-
pass. 71 Only when the entry is challenged does the possibility of a breach
of the peace arise. Thus, the breach of peace issue is resolved without
consideration of the debtor's real property interests.
The repossession of certain types of movable collateral, such as
automobiles, has given rise to various suits in which the repossession is
effected by the creditor's entry onto property owned by someone other
than the debtor. In such cases the debtor's real property interest is not
invaded and, provided there is no opposition that could lead to a breach of
the peace, the creditor is permitted to repossess the collateral, whether it
be from the premises of a third party
72 or a public place. 73
D. Personal Property Interests in the Breach of Peace Definition
1. Damage to Collateral During Repossession.- Since not all
debtors willingly acquiesce to the creditor's demands for repossession,
74
it is often necessary that the creditor break into or do some degree of
damage to the collateral during the debtor's absence to successfully effect
repossession. While both the debtor and creditor have property interests
in the collateral, section 9-503 provides that the creditor's interest be-
comes paramount upon default.7 5 Thus, such methods of repossession as
breaking a window on a car, 76 breaking a handle on the door of a car,77
using a coathanger to break into a car, 78 removing a panel on a truck to
reach inside and unlock it,7 9 and hotwiring an airplane 0 are not interfer-
ences with the debtor's interest in the collateral that will constitute a
breach of the peace.
It is unclear how much force may be employed since the damage in
70. Many pre-Code cases held that this interest amounted to an irrevocable license
and authorized the debtor to undertake virtually any act necessary to effect repossession.
E.g., W.T. Walker Furniture Co. v. Dyson, 32 D.C. 90, 19 L.R.A., N.S. 606 (1908). This
theory has now fallen into disfavor and the verbal protests of the debtor are sufficient to
revoke the license to repossess. See note 85 and accompanying test infra.
71. Raffa v. Dania Bank, 321 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Kroeger v. Ogsden,
429 P.2d 781, 785 (Okla. 1967).
72. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971); Martin v.
Cook, 237 Miss. 267, 114 So. 2d 669 (1959); Furches Motor Co. v. Anderson, 216 Miss. 40,
61 So. 2d 674 (1952); Harris Truck & Trailer Sales v. Foote, 58 Tenn. App. 710, 436 S.W.2d
460 (1968).
73. E.g., McWaters v. Gardner, 37 Ala. App. 418, 69 So. 2d 724 (1954); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 86, 1 So. 2d 776 (1 941); Malone v. Darr, 178 Okla. 443, 62 P.2d
1254 (1936).
74. See Johnson supra note 7, at 95, in which it is noted that in one survey 62% of the
repossessions were achieved with the cooperation, or at least the submission, of the
debtors. Only 38% of the repossessions were effected by use of the self-help remedy.
75. See note 2 supra.
76. Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938); Westerman
v. Oregon Auto. Credit Corp., 168 Or. 216, 122 P.2d 435 (1942).
77. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent, 183 Okla. 547, 83 P.2d 539 (1938).
78. Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962).
79. Martin v. Cook, 237 Miss. 267, 114 So. 2d 669 (1959).
80. Kroeger v. Ogsden, 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967).
the prior cases was insufficient to impair the debtor's interest in the
collateral. It is doubtful whether cases will arise in which a creditor
employs a method of repossession that inflicts excessive damage to the
collateral, since in such cases he will impair his interest in the collateral.
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent 8l the court implied that
excessive damage to the collateral may result in a finding of a breach of
the peace.
2. Repossession of Unsecured Collateral.-As a result of the
expediency of the repossession process a secured party may inadvertently
repossess collateral in which he does not have a secured interest. 82 While
such repossessions may expose the secured party to an action in tort, they
do not constitute such interferences with the debtor's personal property
interest that they rise to the level of a breach of the peace.8 3 The test
enunciated by one court was that
[i]n repossessing this car whether by judicial proceeding or by
its own act, the defendant, under its mortgage had no right
whatever to deprive the plaintiff of any visible property, and
the only purpose and effect of the quoted provision in the
contract [disclaiming liability for repossessing unsecured
property] . . . was to protect it from liability for taking posses-
sion of property which would require a minute checking and
searching of the interior of the car to discover . . . property
which might not be readily visible ....
[Tihe contract did not authorize the seizure and carrying
away of other property plainly visible to any one taking posses-
sion of the car.
4
E. Foreclosure of Repossession by Debtors' Objection-
Compromising the Trilogy of Interests
The greater expansion in the breach of peace definition occurred
when the courts began to rule that the right to assert the self-help remedy
could be foreclosed by the debtor's objection. 85 This principle is based
81. 183 Okla. 547, 548, 83 P.2d 539, 540-41 (1938).
82. In Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), the court found that
sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Code authorized an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process under color of state law. The court noted particularly that
repossession without judicial process often results in the taking of property not
specified as collateral in the security agreement. This is particularly true where
the subjects of the seizure are vehicles which may have other items stored inside
.... Assuming arguendo that the security agreement did work a valid waiver of
the constitutional right to pre-seizure notice and hearng wih regard to the named
collateral, no such assumption can be made as to the extraneous items, and as to
these, the denial of due process is self-evident.
Id. at 621. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed without
addressing the due process problems that arise when unsecured collateral is repossessed.
Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
83. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v, Cole, 503 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)
(conversion).
84. Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 S.C. 138, 146-47, 185 S.E. 180,
183 (1936); accord, Westerman v. Oregon Auto. Credit Corp., 168 Or. 216, 237-38, 122 P.2d
435, 444 (1942).
85. The right to effect the self-help remedy may also be foreclosed when the debtor
upon the "potential for violence" definition of breach of peace in that an
objection by the debtor will serve as the foundation for a possible violent
confrontation if the objection is ignored. When a debtor is faced with the
prospect of repossession, he need not resort to violence nor exert futile
efforts against overwhelming odds to make known his objection. 86 Even
when the collateral is repossessed over the objection and the feared
violence does not materialize, courts have held that the repossession
constituted a breach of the peace. 87 In so holding, at least one court has
noted the infringement of personal interests when the collateral is repos-
sessed over the protests of the debtor.
88
Provided the debtor protests at the time of the repossession, any
previous consent to the repossession in terms of a conditional sales
contract will be ignored, and the creditor will be charged with a breach of
the peace. 89 While this construction of the breach of peace prohibition
tenders payment and demands proof that the creditor has possession of the conditional sales
contract. Under the Code, the right to receive payment is contingent upon possession of the
conditional sales contract. When the debtor refuses to permit repossession and conditions
payment upon presentation of the contract by the creditor, the creditor's only options are to
produce the contract and accept payment or to resort to legal process. The right to exercise
the self-help remedy is permanently foreclosed when such a demand is made and the
creditor cannot subsequently return to effect repossession when the debtor is not present.
Justus v. Universal Credit Co., 189 S.C. 487, 494, I S.E.2d 508, 512 (1939), cf. Westerman
v. Oregon Auto, Credit Corp., 168 Or. 216, 233, 122 P.2d 435,444 (1942); Texas Auto. Co. v.
Clark, 12 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928) (offer to pay off loan discharged lien and
subjected creditor to an action in conversion when he subsequently repossessed the colla-
teral).
While the above mentioned principle had its greatest application under pre-Code law,
the potential for such a foreclosure of the right to repossess is minimal under present
conditional sales contracts. Under pre-Code contracts it was possible to correct a default by
paying those installments that were in arrears. A secured party was often reluctant to accept
payments tendered by the debtor, since there was no assurance that the remainder of the
total indebtedness would ultimately be satisfied. Instead, a creditor could have ignored the
tendered payment and insisted upon repossessing the collateral as the most secure means of
protecting his interest.
Under the present Code the vast majority of conditional sales contracts contain an
acceleration clause that provides that the entire balance of the debt will become immediately
due and payable upon the first default. See R. HENSON & W. DAVENPORT, 5 U.L.A,,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL Cone FORMS AND MATERIALS, Form 9:1155 (1968). If a debtor
defaults under a "modern" conditional sales contract and tenders the payment due under
the contract, the total indebtedness would have been tendered. Because a creditor achieves
the greatest economic return if he secures full payment rather than repossessing the
collateral, he would willingly present the contract and accept the tendered payment. See
note II supra. The result is that few cases will arise in which the debtor will be able to
foreclose the self-help remedy under this principle. If such cases do arise it is unlikely that a
creditor will breach the peace by refusing the tendered payment and electing to repossess
the collateral.
86. See, e.g., Bordeaux v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 115 Mo. App. 556, 563,
91 S.W. 1020, 1021 (1905), Ben Cooper Motor Co. v. Amey, 143 Okla. 75, 76, 287 P. 1017,
1018 (1930).
87. See Crews & Green v. Parker, 192 Ala. 383, 68 So. 287 (1915); Manhattan Credit
Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961); Ben Cooper Motor Co. v. Amey, 143
Okla. 75, 287 P. 1017 (1930).
88. See Wilson v. Kuykendall, 112 Miss. 486, 73 So. 344 (1917) (finding that debtor's
wife was frightened and humiliated when the collateral was taken against her protest).
89. See, e.g., Crews & Green v. Parker, 192 Ala. 303, 68 So. 287 (1916); Morris v.
First Nat'l Bank, 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970).
While the principles enunciated in these cases constitute the general rule, it should be
may reduce the creditor's self-help remedy to mere form without sub-
stance, 90 the rationale for this construction stems from the "potential for
violence" definition of the breach of peace restriction. As one commen-
tator has noted,
It is consistent with the underlying policy to find . . . that a
consent given contemporaneously with the possession is effec-
tive and, on the other hand, that one given weeks or months
before in . . . the security agreement is ineffective. In the
former case, the debtor fully appreciates the consequences of
his consent and has no time in which to change his mind. That is
not so in the latter case. . . .[T]he contemporaneous consent
affords substantial protection against violence, while an earlier
written consent does not. Since the goal of the breach of peace
restriction is to prevent violence, ... the distinction is appro-
priate .91
A further limitation upon the creditor's tenuous right to repossess
arises from the quantum of activity that courts have deemed a sufficient
objection. In three cases in which the party possessing the collateral used
precatory language to express disapproval of the repossession, the courts
found a sufficient protest.92
In light of the harsh consequences that can befall any creditor who
violates the breach of peace restriction, 93 courts should require more than
a subjective dissatisfaction or discontent cloaked in precatory language.
By interpreting the breach of peace restriction to prohibit repossession
over the debtor's protests, the courts are implementing the policies of
protecting the debtor's personal interests and society's concern for pre-
venting activities that may lead to violent confrontations. Further im-
plementation of these policies through a strained interpretation of "suffi-
noted that two recent cases have held that a debtor's protest does not revoke the right to
execute the self-help remedy. It is unclear whether these cases may signal a new trend. See
Hollemback v. Alaska Rural Rehabilitation Corp., 447 P.2d 67 (Alas. 1968); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (dictum). See also RESTATE-
MFNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 272, Comment b at 505-06 (1965).
The general rule is contrary to many of the older repossession cases that held that the
creditor's interest amounted to an irrevocable license to repossess. This finding was based
upon a contractual analysis of the creditor's rights. See, e.g., Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500,
64 S.E. 410 (1909).
90. See, e.g., Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 501-02, 64 S.E. 410 (1909), in which the
court observed that "to allow the [debtor] to revoke [the right to repossess] would be a fraud
upon the rights of the [creditor], and would very much impair the value of chattel mortgages
as securities."
91. White supra note 24, at 815 n.24.
92. See Benschoter v. First Nat'l Bank, 218 Kan. 144, 153, 542 P.2d 1042, 1050 (1975)
(dictum) (son's request that creditor wait until his father's return would be sufficient
protest); Luthy v. Philip Werlein Co., 163 La. 752, 112 So. 709 (1927) (daughter and son
informed creditor that he would have to wait to see their father); Kirkwood v. Hickman, 223
Miss. 372, 377, 78 So. 2d 351, 352 (1955) (daughter-in-law of debtor informed creditor that he
would have to wait until debtor returned home). But cf. McWaters v. Gardner, 37 Ala. App.
418, 420, 69 So. 2d 724, 726 (1954) (employer's expressed wish that creditor wait until
debtor-employee return held insufficient protest).
93. See, e.g., McCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 666, 114 So. 60 (1927)
(deficiency judgment denied). See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R. 2d 358 (1965) for a discussion
of tort liabilities associated with wrongful repossession.
cient" protest, as in the above cases, will, however, inject uncertainty
into the repossession process and should be avoided.
1. Foreclosure of Repossession by Third Party Objection.-Since
a verbal protest is sufficient to revoke the secured party's right to execute
self-help repossession, the question may arise whether third parties have
the authority to provide such protest. The general rule is that third party
protests are sufficient. 94 This general rule marks a change from a number
of older repossession cases.
95
In establishing this rule, courts have not mandated that any specific
relationship exist between the debtor and the objecting third party. 96 It is
unresolved whether a court would deem the protest of a third party, who
lacks any relationship to the debtor or the collateral, a sufficient objection
to render the repossession a breach of the peace. In such a case the
incentive for the third party to defend the collateral, if the protest is
ignored, would be minimal and may in fact interfere with the creditor's
interest in the collateral.
While the verbal protests of the debtor or a third party serve as a
revocation of the right to execute self-help repossession, the secured party
is not without recourse. A single objection does not foreclose later
attempts to repossess and does not limit the creditor's remedies to action
by judicial process.
97
2. Avoidance of the Debtor's Protest by Stealth or Fraud in
Repossession.-Since the right to repossess is easily revoked, many
creditors resort to stealth or employ fraudulent tactics to effect reposses-
sion. 98 Section 9-503 does not mandate that the secured party give notice
94. See McWaters v. Gardner, 37 Ala. App. 418, 69 So. 2d 724 (1954) (by implication)
(employer); Benschoter v. First Nat'l Bank, 218 Kan. 144, 542 P.2d 1042 (1975) (dictum)
(son); Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63 (1933)
(wife); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970) (son); Morrison
v. Galyon Motor Co., 16 Tenn. App. 394, 64 S.W.2d 851 (1932) (dictum) (debtor's "agent").
95. Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 1 So. 2d 776 (1941) (husband);
Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E. 410 (1909) (mother); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rios, 96 Tex.
174, 71 S.W. 275 (1903) (party in possession of collateral with consent of debtor). But cf.
Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, 120 (Sup. Ct. 1967), for
a recent case that implies that a protest by the debtor's landlord did not render the
repossession a breach of the peace.
96. Compare note 94 supra with notes 143-50 and accompanying text infra. When the
third party consents to the repossession, courts closely examine the relationship of the
debtor and the third party to determine whether the consent was valid. When, however, the
third party objects to the repossession, the analysis is abandoned and no special relationship
is required.
97. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ditton, 52 Ala. App. 555, 295 So. 2d 408 (1974); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Winter, 176 Okla. 400, 55 P.2d 1029 (1936); Leedy v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 173 Okla. 445, 48 P.2d 1074 (1935); Westerman v. Oregon Auto.
Credit Corp., 168 Or. 216, 122 P.2d 435 (1942); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d
853 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
98. Comment, Non-Judicial Repossession - Reprisal in Need of Reform, I 1 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 435, 453 (1970).
or demand payment before repossession. 9 Therefore, many creditors
repossess during the debtor's absence and without his knowledge to
foreclose any chance of verbal objection. Most courts have held that the
use of such stealth does not constitute a breach of the peace." 0 Even in
the one jurisdiction in which a stealth restriction does exist,' 0 ' however,
repossession during the debtor's absence or without his knowledge is held
not to fit within this prohibition. 1
02
Since fraud is also permitted in most jurisdictions, the methods of
repossession are as varied as the imaginations and motivations of the
99. Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act the creditor was permitted the option of
giving a twenty to forty day notice of intention to repossess prior to the actual repossession.
The rationale for this provision was to provide the debtor with advance warning to enable
him to raise the back payments and to diminish the creditor's expense in repossessing,
restoring, or selling the collateral. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SAt ES ACT § 17, Commissioners'
Note. The 1949 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code required the creditor to give a
twenty day notice prior to repossession if the collateral was a consumer good and if the
debtor had paid sixty percent of the purchase price or loan. This provision was deleted in the
1950 draft. McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAt.. L.
Ri.v. 58, 77 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)
(repossession of car during the night does not constitute stealth or fraud that amounts to a
breach of the peace).
101. Only Oklahoma defines stealth or fraud as a breach of the peace. E.g., First Nat'l
Bank v. Teat, 4 Okla. 454, 46 P. 474 (1896). Alabama has employed a stealth or fraud
restriction to prohibit a suit for deficiency judgment without holding that a violation of the
restriction constitutes a breach of the peace. McCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala.
666, 668, 114 So. 60, 62 (1927).
102. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent, 183 Okla. 547, 83 P.2d 539
(1938); Malone v. Darr, 178 Okla. 443, 62 P.2d 1254 (1936); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Winter, 176 Okla. 400, 55 P.2d 1029 (1936); Leedy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 173
Okla. 445, 48 P.2d 1074 (1935).
The continued validity of the Oklahoma stealth restriction is questionable in light of the
manner in which that restriction has been interpreted. The original rule enunciated in 1896
arose out of a case in which the creditor repossessed the collateral without the consent of
the debtor. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma enunciated the rule that a repossession
constituted a breach of the peace if it was carried out by force, stealth, or fraud. First Nat'l
Bank v. Teat, 4 Okla. 454, 456, 46 P. 474, 475 (1896). The rule was next applied in Wilson
Motor Co. v. Dunn, 129 Okla. 211,264 P. 194 (1928), a case in which a garage was forcibly
entered. Since Wilson, the Oklahoma courts have continued to espouse the rule and have
narrowly defined conduct that constitutes stealth or fraud-
The general rule, with its stealth or fraud restriction, was enunciated in cases in which
stealth or fraud was not the basis for a finding of breach of the peace. Murrell v. Griswold,
338 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1959) (repossession by forcible breaking into commercial structure);
Wilson Motor Co. v. Dunn, 129 Okla. 211, 264 P. 194 (1928) (repossession by forcible entry
into garage). When the repossession is effected during the debtor's absence, however, and
there exists no other rationale for finding a breach of peace, the Oklahoma courts have
found that the activity does not rise to the level of stealth or fraud. General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent, 183 Okla. 547, 83 P.2d 539 (1938); Malone v. Darr, 178 Okla.
443, 62 P.2d 1254 (1936); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Winter, 176 Okla. 400, 53 P.2d 1029
(1936); Leedy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 173 Okla. 4.45, 48 P.2d 1074 (1935).
The rule was further confused in Kroeger v. Ogsden, 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967), in
which the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that the debtor had constructive notice of the
repossession since he had been informed that repossession was imminent. As a result of this
constructive notice, the court held that the subsequent repossession, which was affected
during the debtor's absence, did not entail the use of stealth or fraud. Id. at 784-85. The
negative implication of the Kroeger opinion is that any repossession during the debtor's
absence, when the debtor does not have constructive notice, would amount to stealth. This
implication contravenes the principles enunciated in Leedy, Winter, Malone, and Vincent.
secured parties. Provided the methods do not violate some public policy,
they will be accepted by the courts. The extent of the permissible methods
and countervailing policies are discussed below.
In Moody v. Nides Finance Co.'03 the debtor directed his sister-in-
law to go to the office of the secured party to tender payment of the
monthly installment that was in arrears. The man in charge refused to
accept payment until the car was road-tested to ensure that the finance
company's investment in the car had not been impaired. Upon securing
the keys and conducting the road-test, he informed the sister-in-law that
the car was being repossessed.104 While the court denied the creditor's
suit for a deficiency judgment, the rationale for doing so was the cred-
itor's failure to give the debtor the notice required in the conditional sales
contract before the sale of the collateral. Since the court did not challenge
the method of repossession, this may be construed as impliedly sanction-
ing the method employed. 105
Two cases of rather ancient vintage have even sanctioned fraudulent
misrepresentations to gain entry to a debtor's residence. In Montenegro-
Riehm Music Co. v. Beuris1°6 and F.A. North & Co. v. Williams 7 the
courts found no wrongful activity when the secured parties gained entry
to the debtor's residence and repossessed pianos by posing as piano
tuners. As one court reasoned,
If a citizen desired to see another upon business which he knew
to be unpleasant to the latter, and chose to assign some other
than the real reason for asking admission, he certainly would
not become a trespasser merely because he failed to give the
true reason. 10
While no recent cases have been decided, a court faced with a fact
situation analogous to Beuris and Williams may reach a similar conclu-
sion by evaluating the underlying policies of the self-help remedy and the
interests of the debtor and secured party in the repossession process.
Although many courts have held that an invasion of a debtor's home
during his absence is a breach of the peace,' 19 their rationale is to protect
the sanctity of the home and to guard against the potential threat of a
breach of the peace.' 10 In implementing these policies, courts have
adopted a real property analysis of the breach of peace restriction. When,
103. 115 Ga. App. 859, 156 S.E.2d 310 (1967).
104. Id. at 860, 156 S.E.2d at 311.
105. Id.; accord, Cox v. Galigher Motor Sales Co., - W. Va. -, 213 S.E.2d 475, 479
(1975) (no breach of peace when creditor secured repossession of a truck by fraudulently
promising to correct a defect in the engine). Contra Barham v. Standridge, 201 Ark. 1143,
148 S.W.2d 648 (1941); Franklin v. Spratt, 174 Ark. 268, 295 S.W. 26 (1927).
The court's holding in Moody is a change from prior Georgia cases that, until 1967, held
that such fraudulent repossession methods were a breach of the peace. Church v. Trail-
mobile, Inc., 90 Ga. App. 750, 109 S.E.2d 636 (1959).
106. 160 Ky. 557, 169 S.W. 986 (1914).
107. 120 Pa. 109, 13 A. 723 (1888).
108. [d. at 119, 13 A. at 727.
109. See note 43 and. accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
however, the debtor is present and consents to the entry, albeit in
response to a fraudulent misrepresentation, the invasion of the debtor's
real property interest is less offensive and necessitates less protection of
that interest than if the debtor were not present. " Hence, there is a lesser
need for this property-oriented analysis. Similarly, such a misrepresenta-
tion should not be classified as a breach of the peace when it is evaluated
from the perspective of either possible retaliatory violence or an invasion
of the debtor's personal interests. Since the debtor consents to the misre-
presentation, the possibility for a violent confrontation is minimal.
Likewise, while the creditor's fraudulent misrepresentation should not be
wholeheartedly encouraged, such misrepresentation does not constitute
an invasion of the debtor's personal interests as those interests are de-
fined.''
2
One fraudulent method of repossession that courts have consistently
found to violate public policy and to constitute a breach of the peace is to
secure repossession under color of legal process when no legal process
can be adduced. In Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler 11 the secured party
was accompanied by a sheriff when he attempted to repossess. Both the
creditor and the sheriff lacked the "proper legal papers" to secure
repossession. In finding a breach of peace, the court concluded that
defendant Kessler had a right to obstruct, by any lawful and
reasonable means, any attempt by plaintiff to forceably repos-
sess the tractor [citation omitted] . . . .However, confronted
by the sheriff, who announced his intention to participate in the
repossession, it was not necessary for Kessler to either threaten
violence or offer physical resistance ...
l . . [Wihen the sheriff. . . having no authority to do so,
told the defendant Kessler, 'We come over to pick up this
tractor', he was acting colore officii and became a participant in
the repossession, regardless of the fact that he did not physical-
ly take part in the retaking. Plaintiff contends that its sole
purpose in having the sheriff present was to prevent anticipated
violence. The effect, however, was to prevent the defendant
Kessler from exercising his right to resist by all lawful and
responsible means a non-judicial take-over. To put the stamp of
approval upon this method of repossession would be to com-
pletely circumvent the purpose and intent of the statute.14
11l. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 173 (1965), which provides that such
misrepresentation would render the consent ineffective. It should be noted that section 173
applies to any entry onto the land while, according to commercial law, the secured creditor
has a license to enter onto the premises of the debtor to effectuate repossession. See notes
70-71 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, this tort principle may not be applicable to a
commercial setting.
112. See note 27 supra.
113. I Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970).
114. Id. at 754-57, 463 P.2d at 654-55 (emphasis added); accord, See v. Automobile
Discount Corp., 330 Mo. 906, 50 S.W.2d 993 (1932); Firebaugh v. Gunther, 106 Okla. 131,
233 P. 460 (1925); Roberts v. Speck, 169 Wash. 613, 14 P.2d 33 (1932). But cf. Grossman v.
Weiss, 129 Misc. 234, 221 N.Y.S. 266 (App. Div. 1927) (no breach of the peace when sheriff
repossessed under writ void on its face); Day v. National Bond & Inv. Co., 99 S.W.2d 117
(Mo. Ct. App. 1936) (process server did not act under color of law when he posed as a
constable and secured repossession under an order of replevin that on its face showed that it
The extent of the prohibition against acting under color of judicial
process is best illustrated by Rhodes-Carroll Furniture Co. v. Webb.
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In Webb the court held that the creditor's misrepresentation to the
debtor's wife that he was an "officer" was such that her consent to the
repossession was invalid.'16 While this case represents the majority
position, a different result was reached in Besner v. Smith," 7 in which
the secured party's agent fraudulently displayed a badge and asserted that
he was a "marshal" who had come to repossess the collateral.
It should be noted that the analysis in Besner was oriented strictly to
the one aspect of the criminal law definition of breach of peace that
necessitates a use of force or violence." 8 Ignoring the public policy
against such misrepresentations of legal process, the court declared,
"Any use of subterfuge, . . . did not diminish the legal right of seller to
peaceably regain his own property unlawfully held."" 9 Because no
objection was made and no force employed, the method of repossession
was deemed lawful.
3. Repossession by the Creditor: Foreclosure of the Debtor's
Option to Revoke the Possessory Right.-While the policy of section 9-
503 is to prevent activities that constitute or may lead to a breach of the
peace, this policy does not require a secured party to compromise his
interest in every respect to comply with the breach of peace restriction.
When the secured party has effected repossession of the collateral to the
exclusion of the debtor, the breach of peace analysis is more oriented to
the creditor's personal property interest in the collateral and less concern-
ed with the personal or property interests of the debtor or the societal
interests against the use of force or violence. Once the secured party has
gained repossession of his collateral, he has the same right to defend his
possession as any other property owner z" including the right to use
reasonable force. 1
2'
Since the moment of repossession is determinative of the secured
party's right to defend the collateral, it is imperative to ascertain when the
secured party has sufficient dominion over the collateral to preclude the
debtor from objecting to its repossession. In La Porte Motor Co. v.
Firemen's Insurance Co. 122 the court established the test that
there must be a legal taking including adequate assertion of
was void). Contra, Halloway v. Arnold, 92 Mo. 293, 5 S.W. 277 (1887) (when sheriff merely
accompanies the secured party and does not act under colore officii there is no wrongful
repossession).
115. 230 Ala. 251, 160 So. 247 (1935).
116. Id. at 252, 160 So. at 248.
117. 178 A.2d 924 (D.C. 1962).
118. Id. at 926.
119. Id.
120. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND)'OF TORTS § 77 with § 109 (1965).
121. See Biggs v. Seufferlein, 164 Iowa 241,249, 145 N.W. 507,510 (914); Westerman
v. Oregon Auto. Credit Corp., 168 Or. 216, 237, 122 P.2d 435, 444 (1942).
122. 209 Wis. 397, 245 N.W. 105 (1932).
possession by the seller precluding the buyer from interposing
objection and placing upon the one seeking to repossess the
duty of resorting to legal proceedings.'
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As may be expected, this test finds its most practical application in
cases in which the collateral is an automobile. In La Porte the court held
that the above test was not satisfied when an agent of the La Porte Motor
Company found the car on a public street, drove it one block, parked it in
front of the creditor's place of business, locked the car, and took the keys.
In holding that the debtor's subsequent retaking was not wrongful, the
court noted that the first repossession did not provide the debtor with
sufficient notice that the creditor was responsible for moving the vehicle
and did
not put the car so completely in the possession of the [creditor]
as to preclude [the debtor] from exercising opposition to the
[creditor's] maintaining possession. . . . After the moving,
had [the creditor] discovered [the debtor] in the act of driving
the car away, there would have arisen the necessity of obtaining
consent or resorting to proper legal proceedings to accomplish
its taking. 
24
When the facts in La Porte are assessed by the test enunciated in that
case, the ruling and logic of the court seem faulty. The facts appear to
satisfy the test that the creditor had gained sufficient dominion over the
automobile to have effected repossession. The subsequent retaking by the
debtor thus constituted an infringement upon the creditor's possessory
interest. A possible explanation for the pro-debtor ruling is that the case
arose out of a suit by the creditor to recover the price of the car from the
insurance company that had provided coverage against theft. In finding
that the car had not been stolen by the debtor because it had never been
fully repossessed by the creditor, the court may have been motivated
more by a desire to protect the insurance company than by a desire to
strictly apply its own test. While the court acknowledged the absence of
any proof that the debtor was responsible for retaking the car, this fact
was assumed to permit the insurance company to escape liability.'
25
Other courts confronted with similar circumstances have achieved more
consistent results.
In Westerman v. Oregon Automobile Credit Corp. 126 the La Porte
123. Id. at 402, 245 N.W. at 106. But cf. Biggs v. Seufferlein, 164 Iowa 241, 145 N.W.
507 (1914). In Biggs the debtor authorized the creditor to enter her home and repossess a
stove. The court held that once portions of the stove were disassembled and removed, the
debtor was estopped from interposing an objection and precluding removal of the remaining
portions.
124. 209 Wis. at 400-01, 245 N.W. at 106; accord, Kensinger Acceptance Corp. v.
Davis, 223 Ark. 942, 269 S.W.2d 792 (1954) in which it was determined that possession had
not passed to the creditor when its employees removed the key from the car and informed
the debtor that it had been repossessed. When the debtor produced a new key and attempted
to insert it into the ignition the employee's opposition was deemed wrongful. Id. at 943-44,
269 S.W.2d at 793.
125. La Porte Motor Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 397, 400, 245 N.W. 105, 106
(1932).
126. 168 Or. 216, 122 P.2d 435 (1942).
test was satisfied, since the creditor sat behind the wheel of a car the key
for which had been left in the ignition. The court established that the
creditor had sufficient possession of the automobile to render the debtor's
subsequent ouster of the creditor wrongful. 127 The Westerman case,
however, does not stand for the proposition that the creditor has secured
repossession merely by sitting behind the steering wheel of the car. In
C.LT. Corp. v. Brewer 128 an agent of C.I.T. attempted to remove an
automobile from Brewer's possession. Brewer had a repairman's lien on
the car and had removed the key and stored it in his garage. His
possession did not terminate when C.I.T.'s agent placed himself behind
the steering wheel and attempted to remove the automobile by using the
starter motor as power. 1
29
F. Consent and Breach of Peace
Just as a debtor's protest will preclude a lawful repossession, the
debtor's consent to the repossession precludes a finding of breach of
peace. 130 As the cases have demonstrated, however, even this basic
principle has led to numerous points of controversy.
1. Presumption of Consent in the Repossession Environment.-
The first point of controversy stems from a presumption about the nature
of repossession. As one court has decided, "It can be safely stated that
absence of consent to repossession of personal property for default in
payment of [a] conditional sales contract is implied."131 In contrast, other
courts have concluded that the presumption lies in favor of the creditor,
and the debtor must prove that the repossession was effected without his
consent and was accompanied by some form of protest. 1
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2. Elements of Valid Consent.-Another point of controversy
stems from the determination whether the debtor has given valid consent
to the repossession. It is difficult to extract from these cases any firm
principles that may be applied to any fact situation. Essentially courts
have resolved the cases on an ad hoc basis and often look to the subjective
actions of the debtor and creditor to determine whether consent was
given.' 
3 3
127. Id. at 237, 122 P.2d at 443.
128. 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941).
129. Id. at 251, 200 So. at 911-12.
130. Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 358, § 4 (1965).
131. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ditton, 52 Ala. App. 555, 558, 295 So. 2d 408, 411 (1974);
cf. Carey v. Interstate Bond & Mortgage Co., 4 Wash. App. 2d 632, 104 P.2d 579 (1940)
(repossession cannot be effected without actual consent by the debtor).
132. Johnson v. Modern Furniture & Appliance Co., 76 So. 2d 338 (La. Ct. App. 1954);
cf. Rutledge v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 218 Ark. 510,237 S.W.2d 469 (1951) (consent
implied when creditor informed debtor that car was being repossessed and debtor made no
response).
133. Cf. Allen v. McKinney, 50 So. 2d 644, 647 (La. Ct. App. 1951), in which the court
noted that the creditor's abandonment of his efforts in the midst of repossession was one
element of proof that consent had not been given.
Many of the principles in this area have been derived from cases
decided by Louisiana courts. Although Louisiana has not adopted Article
9 of the Code' 34 and prohibits a creditor from entering the premises of the
debtor to repossess collateral, 135 repossession is permitted when the
debtor gives valid consent. 136 In light of the paucity of case law in other
jurisdictions that interprets this aspect of section 9-503, these cases may
provide some precedent for determining what constitutes consent to
repossession. It should be noted, however, that because Louisiana has
adopted a pro-debtor approach, its decisions on debtor consent to repos-
session may also represent a pro-debtor position.
The Louisiana courts have found that consent to repossession does
not exist when the debtor merely acquiesces to a demand that the debtor
either pay or face repossession. The rationale is that such a demand is
"strangely reminiscent of the highwayman's demand 'Your money or
your life""' 137 and carries an implication of coercion to which an unin-
hibited authorization to repossess cannot be given. One court has con-
cluded that, even in the absence of an articulated ultimatum by the
secured party, there is no valid consent when the debtor believes that the
same compulsion existed, even if the feeling was self-induced.
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Consent may or may not be found depending upon the actions of the
debtor. Thus, when the debtor exhibited hysteria, excitement and began
to cry, the court noted that consent was obviously lacking. 139 The refusal
by a debtor to surrender a set of car keys upon demand likewise evidenced
a lack of consent. " In Robinson v. Hook'4 ' the removal of personal
items from furniture that was being repossessed did not amount to tacit
consent. The court reasoned that the debtor's actions were merely intend-
134. See note I supra.
135. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4563 (West 1951).
136. See Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 223 La. 504, 506, 66 So.
2d 317, 318 (1953).
137. Price v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 95 So. 2d 834, 836 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
138. Cf. Blaman v. Gulf Furniture Co., 16 So. 2d 561 (La. Ct. App. 1944). Debtor's
testimony that "I owed some money and I figure I have to let them take it, because it [sic]
didn't have the money they asked for" was held not to amount to a valid consent, because
the debtor was unaware that she had an additional option of objecting to prevent the
repossession. Id. at 562. The implication of this holding is that creditors may no longer take
advantage of the debtor's ignorance of his right to protest when his collateral is repossessed.
In essence, it would require that whenever the debtor is present at the time of the reposses-
sion, the creditor must inform him of his right to protest and foreclose repossession. This
holding of the Louisiana court is incompatible with other rules of repossession according to
which collateral may be repossessed during the debtor's absence and no prior request for
repossession is mandated. See note 100 and accompanying text supra. Since such a failure
to inform may arguably amount to an implied misrepresentation of the rights of the debtor,
the ruling is also inconsistent with other rulings that repossession may be affected by
express misrepresentation. See notes 103-08 and accompanying text supra. The effect of
Blaman would be to encourage creditors to employ greater stealth in repossession to assure
that the debtor is absent when repossession is carried out. See Austin v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 239 Miss. 699, 125 So. 2d 79 (1960) for an analogous fact situation in
which a Mississippi court found that the debtor's acquiescence constituted valid consent.
139. Allen v. McKinney, 50 So. 2d 644 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
140. Ben Cooper Motor Co. v. Amey, 143 Okla. 75, 287 P. 1017 (1930).
141. I So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1941).
ed.to minimize her damages and did not rise to the level of consent.142
3. Third Party Consent to Repossession .- While proper consent
by the debtor may foreclose a finding of breach of peace, the authority of
third parties to give binding consent to repossession raises a separate
question. The solution to this question depends upon a resolution of three
considerations. The two most important are the maturity of the third party
and the third party's apparent authority to give consent for the debtor. A
third element that is of lesser importance is the relationship of the third
party to the collateral.
When the third party is obviously of insufficient age, valid consent
cannot be given. 143 When, however, the third party is mature enough and
is closely related to the debtor, the third party's consent to the reposses-
sion has been held valid.'" In Bullock v. Young145 the teenage son of the
debtor was found competent to give binding consent. The court noted
particularly that the son was the principle user of the car and held that this
evidence was relevant in determining his authority to consent to reposses-
sion.146
While the prior cases entailed consent by third parties to an entry
upon the property of the debtor, authorization to enter a structure oc-
cupied by the debtor was not in issue. In Royal Furniture Co. v. Fillion 147
the court held that a landlord could authorize entry into the debtor's
leased premises to facilitate repossession. In Fillion it appeared that the
debtor-lessee had abandoned the premises and the court noted that the
creditor's action was a legitimate means to mitigate his damages. In
addition, the possibility of a breach of the peace was diminished because
the landlord had consented to the entry and the creditor had taken the
precaution of conferring with counsel prior to repossession. ' 4' Thus, the
holding in Fillion does not signal the unleashing of all restraints on the
authority of third parties to permit entries into residential structures.
A contrary holding was enunciated, for example, in McDaniel v.
Leiberman,t4 in which the lessee of a commercial structure authorized
the secured party to enter and repossess collateral held by the lessor. The
court concluded that the lessee's relationship to the structure was insuffi-
cient to permit him to authorize such entry. The court noted,
142. Id. at 337. See Levy v. Andress-Hanna, Inc., 96 So. 2d 373 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (by
implication).
143. Luthy v. Philip Werlein Co., 163 La. 752, 112 So. 709 (1927) (young daughter). See
Benschoter v. First Nat'l Bank, 218 Kan. 144, 153, 542 P.2d 1042, 1049-50 (1975) (by
implication) (seventeen year old son competent to give binding consent).
144. Bing v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 237 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.S.C. 1965)
(sister); Austin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 239 Miss. 699, 125 So. 2d 79 (1960)
(wife).
145. 118 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1955).
146. Id. at 918.
147. 121 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
148. Id. at 260.
149. 157 So. 834 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
[s]uch voluntary surrender on the part of the tenant cannot
affect the legal rights of the landlord who is the owner of the
property, and who alone can consent to its removal from the
premises.
150
In general, the authority of a third party to consent to repossession is less
effective to bind the debtor than is a third party objection to foreclose the
right to exert the self-help remedy.'
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4. Contractual Consent to Breach of the Peace.- Since the term
"breach of peace" is not defined in the Code, creditors may elect to
define that term in the conditional sales contract. The natural temptation
would be to narrowly confine the definition to permit activities that would
otherwise constitute a breach of peace. While section 9-501 of the Code
provides that certain rights may not be waived by the debtor, the rights
under section 9-503 are not included in this list. While it is doubtful
whether courts would permit a blanket authorization of conduct that
amounts to a blatant breach of the peace, courts have been lenient in favor
of creditors when the repossession is only a marginal breach and the
conditional sales contract authorized such activity. 152 For example, in one
case in which the creditor gained entry to a commercial structure by
means of a "technical" breaking' 53 and in another in which there was a
repossession by means of a fraudulent misrepresentation of judicial proc-
ess," the courts relied partially upon contractual provisions that dis-
claimed liability for such actions to find no breach of the peace when it
would have otherwise existed. 5 5
Cases have arisen in which the contractual provision takes the form
of something more than a "permissive" definition of breach of peace and
purports to authorize the use of force to effect repossession. '5 6 While they
are seldom pleaded in cases of violence directed against the debtor,
creditors have sought sanctuary in such clauses to justify a breaking into
the debtor's residence. Courts have consistently held that such clauses
contravene public policy and are no defense to charges of breach of
peace.' 57 The rationale for this holding is that
150. Id. at 836; cf. Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 369, 17 S.E.2d 869,876
(1941) (by implication) (keys supplied by one not authorized to permit entry will not
exonerate creditor from a charge of breach of the peace).
151. Compare notes 143-50 and accompanying text supra with notes 94-96 and accom-
panying text supra.
152. Clarke, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure and Deficiency: A Journey to the
Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302, 310 (1972).
153. Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277,281,282 N.Y.S.2d 114, 120 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
154. Besner v. Smith, 178 A.2d 924, 926 (D.C. 1962).
155. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra in which it is noted that even a
"technical" breaking is a breach of the peace and notes 113-16 and accompanying text
supra for the proposition that a misrepresentation of judicial process is a breach of the
peace.
156. Massachusetts and Oregon have statutes expressly prohibiting contractual provi-
sions that authorize breach of the peace. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 10(5) (West
1977); OR. REV. SrAT. § 83.670(2) (1975).
157. See Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148, 150 (D.C. 1958); Girard v. Anderson,
[t]he insertion in a mortgage of a clause whereby a mort-
gagor purportedly consents in advance to a breaking and enter-
ing is an attempt to confer upon a mortgagee an extraordinary
privilege not enjoyed by an absolute owner and is not needed
for the reasonable protection of the mortgagee's investment.
The existence of the privilege is a threat to the peace and
contrary to public policy. A contractual provision purporting to
authorize a breaking is, therefore, void. 8
IV. Conclusion
The self-help remedy has been characterized by one leading com-
mentator as "a remedy of ancient and honorable lineage." 15 9 What began
as an acquiescence to the anarchy of the impulse for revenge has evolved
into a useful and respected remedy in commercial financing. The culmi-
nation of this ancient remedy is section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
The success and continued viability of the self-help remedy may be
explained by its ability to adapt to the changing needs of society. In
achieving this adaptation, the courts have delicately balanced the historic
interests of the debtor and creditor in the collateral, the personal interests
of the debtor, the debtor's interest in the security of his residence, and
society's prohibition against the use of force to effect repossession. The
vehicle for this balancing process has been the breach of peace restriction
on the self-help remedy. The breach of peace restriction has thus provided
flexibility for the self-help remedy and has helped to perpetuate this form
of procedure.
By applying the traditional criminal law definition of breach of
peace and by expanding upon the "potential for violence" aspect of that
definition, courts have been able to adequately protect the debtor from
most creditor abuse. In certain cases, however, courts have unjustifiably
expanded the breach of peace definition through this "potential for
violence" prohibition. 160 The result has been to inject uncertainty into the
repossession process and to impose unwarranted constraints upon any
219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Hileman v. Harter Bank & Trust Co., 174 Ohio St. 95,
186 N.E.2d 853 (1962); Stewart v. F.A. North Co., 65 Pa. Super. 195, 200 (1916).
158. Hileman v. Harter Bank & Trust Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 97, 186 N.E.2d 853, 854-55
(1962).
159. Mentschikoff supra note 7 at 767.
160. In Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd
mem., 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975), the court interpreted the "potential" aspect of the
breach of peace definition and concluded that any act of repossession could provoke a
breach of the peace. The court thus declared section 9-503 unconstitutional. The court
reasoned,
[Tlhe taking of goods from another's possession, without the latter's contem-
poraneous consent, necessarily involves the hostile physical invasion of the
possessor's personal territory, and is a serious assault upon his dignity, privacy
and self-esteem. Such an invasion tends to excite emotions and to provoke violent
retaliation.
380 F. Supp. at 965. This construction of the self-help remedy is vaguely reminiscent of the
retaliatory impulse that one commentator noted is the historic antecedent of the self-help
remedy. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. Hopefully, our legal institutions have
evolved to the extent that they are able to control this impulse and can give the breach of
peace restriction a more flexible interpretation than in Watson.
creditor who seeks to assert the self-help remedy. Consequently, in its
present form the self-help remedy is restricted to a rather narrow range of
cases.16It should be noted that the ancient remedy of distress was rendered
ineffective when it became overburdened with form.16 Further con-
straints, if imposed, may signal a similar death knell for section 9-503.
Before the self-help remedy is further constrained by interpretations of
the breach of peace restriction, the effect upon the commercial utility of
the self-help remedy should be assessed. For "[o]nly when society has
developed a complex and powerful legal organization can mankind safely
surrender the right to seif-redress."
16 3
EUGENE MIKOLAJCZYK
161. The only collateral that may consistently be repossessed by means of the self-help
remedy is automobiles. Household items may only be repossessed by securing the consent
of the debtor or by committing a breach of the peace. Mentschikoff supra note 7, at 779
n.34; White supra note 7, at 513.
162. 3 STREET supra note 8, at 280.
163. Id. at 279.

